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Abstract 
International organizations sometimes institutionalize country groupings by specifying 
differentiated rules and commitments that may, in turn, generate new negotiation dynamics. 
Drawing on psychological and incentive-based arguments, we develop a ―constructed peer 
group‖ hypothesis suggesting that by creating these groups those organizations may actually 
construct new lines of confrontation over and above the substance-based disagreements 
existing between countries in the first place. This generates a particular type of path 
dependence rendering broad-based international agreements more difficult in the future.  
We analyze this question at the example of the UNFCCC‘s increasingly politicized split 
between Annex I and non-Annex I countries. Using a self-coded dataset of country statements 
during the negotiation rounds between December 2007 and December 2009 we assess 
whether Annex I membership influences a country‘s stance towards other countries‘ 
arguments. To disentangle the effect of group construction from the effect of various 
background characteristics that may drive countries‘ preferences and, simultaneously, the 
affiliation to Annex I, we complement our regression analysis with quasi-experimental 
methods drawn from the treatment evaluation literature. We find that, over and above the ex 
ante differences in preferences, the split between Annex I and non-Annex I countries has 
indeed influenced negotiation behavior and thereby amplified the existing divide between 
developing and industrialized countries.  
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1. Introduction 
―Why shouldn‘t I date an Annex I guy?‖ asked Leela Raina in an article written during the 
UN climate negotiations in Bangkok (Raina 2009). The Indian climate activist lists a couple 
of reasons: Annex I guys are not willing to commit, they usually take more space in the 
relationship, they refuse to finance dinners, they are possessive and want daily records and 
they have a consumption-oriented lifestyle. 
With her article, Raina neatly captures a deep divide between developed and developing 
countries in international climate policy. Observers of the negotiation process believe that the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has led to this split by 
listing OECD and transition countries in the so called ‗Annex I‘ of the Convention, as a 
means of differentiating the greenhouse gas reduction and reporting commitments of these 
countries. They argue that over time, the distinction has become more and more politicized 
and rigid (see, e.g., Höhne 2005, p. 37). 
The UNFCCC is not the only international organization that has adopted differentiated rules 
for groups of countries. In fact, several other multilateral environmental agreements, 
including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 1983 International 
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer, the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity and the 1994 United 
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, have incorporated the notion of differentiated 
responsibility of states with respect to the protection of the environment. The basis of this 
differentiated responsibility is the recognition of the future development needs of poor 
countries, of other special needs and circumstances of certain countries, and of the different 
contribution of countries to the specific environmental problem at hand. The resulting 
differential treatment usually consists of less stringent obligations, different timing of the 
application of provisions (grace periods or delayed implementation of obligations, or priority 
implementation in specially affected countries), and international assistance in terms of 
financing, capacity building or technology transfer (Matsui 2002, Hepburn and Ahmad 2005).  
Another notable example is the World Trade Organization with its ―Special and Differential 
Treatment‖ provisions, which are based on the notion that countries at different levels of 
development have different trade policy needs (Page and Kleen 2005). The 1979 Enabling 
Clause formally established differential treatment for developing countries and, among them, 
for Least Developed Countries (LDCs). In recent negotiation rounds on specific trade areas, 
however, different sub-groups of developing countries, according to different criteria, have 
been granted preferential treatment. In this context, it has been noted that the existing country 
categories have become rigid and are being considered as negotiation goals themselves. As a 
result, there has been a discussion about how to make this differential treatment more flexible 
and dynamic and how to establish differentiation categories and graduation rules to allow this 
flexibility (see, e.g., Hoekman et al. 2004, Kasteng et al. 2004, Page and Kleen 2005, 
Hoekman and Özden 2006).  
In this paper, we propose a ―constructed peer-group‖ hypothesis, whereby the ―constructed‖ 
peer group is itself a result of the negotiation process, and stands in contrast to a ―natural‖ 
peer-group based on country characteristics that lead to similar preferences and natural 
coalitions. Our hypothesis suggests that once these groups are constructed and 
institutionalized, divisions between countries may follow the delimiting lines between these 
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groups. More specifically, we expect that the group building process itself alters the countries‘ 
incentives, and, as a consequence, their negotiation behavior. For instance, countries in 
groupings initially granted certain exemptions from economic or financial adjustment 
obligations will have an incentive to jointly lobby for the continuation of this preferential 
treatment in subsequent negotiation rounds, whereas countries with such obligations will feel 
encouraged to lobby for the abolition of the preferential treatment. In addition, country 
groupings may imply increased discussions within these groups and thereby enhance mutual 
understanding and support, accentuating a group profile that may, in fact, have been relatively 
flue in the first place. Eventually, the decision to form specific country groups may drive the 
discussions in a different direction than they would take otherwise (path dependence) and 
render broad-based international agreements even more difficult.  
This paper will use the example of the UNFCCC to assess to what extent the ex ante 
categorization of member countries may indeed amplify the divide between them. The 
empirical challenge is to differentiate between the effect of institutionalized groupings and the 
impact of policy preferences that can be explained by different country characteristics. To do 
so, we examine the factors leading countries to openly express support for other countries‘ 
positions during the UNFCCC negotiation rounds from December 2007 to December 2009. 
Based on protocols of the negotiations published in the Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB), 
we code all statements by countries declaring support for other countries‘ previous 
interventions. We then assess the impact of Annex I membership and various country 
characteristics on this variable in a multivariate censored regression framework. Moreover, 
we complement this analysis by an econometric evaluation using propensity score matching. 
As a fully non-parametric method this estimation strategy is independent of functional form 
assumptions. In addition, the matching approach limits our comparison to actually comparable 
countries – thereby eliminating a potentially important source of bias.  
The idea that institutionalized groupings may influence the further negotiation process already 
exists among observers of the climate change negotiations, and the implications of being 
included in one or the other group have been discussed already (in addition to the literature 
mentioned above, see also Baumert et al. 1999 and 2002; and Gupta 2010). Furthermore, the 
normative perspective about why country differentiation should be pursued and how this 
should be done has been examined from a legal point of view (e,g, Rajamani 2000). However, 
we are not aware of any systematic theoretical and empirical assessment of the effects of 
institutionalized country differentiation on the future negotiation process itself. This may be 
related to the lack of a theoretical framework to explain such effects, and to the lack of 
appropriate data. This paper now proposes some theoretical ideas on why institutionalized 
groups may affect the negotiation process. Moreover, it provides an empirical test of the 
―constructed peer group hypothesis‖ based on a new data set generated through extensive 
coding of ENBs. 
In the following, we will first describe the context of our UNFCCC example (Section 2). In 
Section 3 we then propose a theoretical framework describing our ―constructed peer-group‖ 
hypothesis and linking it to existing psychological and incentive-based arguments from a 
broader literature on cooperation and international negotiations. This hypothesis is assessed 
based on data described in Section 4. Section 5 explains the empirical estimation approach 
and presents the results of our analysis. Section 6 completes the paper with the main 
conclusions and a discussion of policy implications for international negotiation processes in 
general. 
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2. Setting the scene: Different countries, different rules – the background of Annex I  
The ultimate goal of the UNFCCC is the ―stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in 
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow 
ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not 
threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner‖ 
(UNFCCC 1992, Art. 2). 
In Article 4 of the Convention, all countries commit to publish inventories of greenhouse 
gases (GHGs), as well as national measures taken in order to mitigate or adapt to climate 
change. They agree to cooperate in technology development and transfer, in the management 
and conservation of GHG sinks
1
, in adaptation, and in research and education related to 
climate change (UNFCCC 1992, Art. 4.1).  
In addition to these general commitments of all UNFCCC member countries, the Convention 
stipulates additional efforts for those countries which, in 1992, were recognized as historically 
responsible for most of the emissions and wealthy enough to bear the bulk of the greenhouse 
gas mitigation costs. Accordingly, the Convention‘s first guiding principle is ―common but 
differentiated responsibilities‖: 
“[…] the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the 
adverse effects thereof.” (UNFCCC 1992, Art. 3.1) 
The developed countries supposed to take the lead – basically the then OECD members plus 
selected countries of the former Soviet Union – were listed in Annex I of the Convention (for 
the individual countries, see Figure 1). Article 4.2 of the Convention defines the objective of 
returning CO2 emissions of Annex I countries to 1990 levels by 2000. The Kyoto Protocol in 
1997 led to additional binding targets for a list of countries that widely corresponds to 
UNFCCC, Annex I (Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol).
2
 A subset of Annex I countries further 
agreed to provide financial support to developing countries to assist them with their reporting 
requirements, provide technology transfer and contribute to adaptation processes in 
particularly vulnerable countries, e.g., small island countries (UNFCCC 1992, Art. 4.3).  
While some procedural mechanisms for regular revisions of Annex I were foreseen within the 
Convention, there was no in-built graduation principle related, e.g., to per capita income or 
emission levels. Correspondingly, there has been little change over time. A few European 
countries joined Annex I in 1997 when they joined the Convention: the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia – replacing Czechoslovakia, as well as Croatia, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and Slovenia 
(UNFCCC 2000). Otherwise, changes of the country list in Annex I have proven to be 
extremely contentious. No move between non-Annex I and Annex I has ever taken place so 
far. In 1998 Argentina and Kazakhstan proposed to take up emission targets (thereby joining 
Annex I), but this was prevented through the fierce opposition of other developing countries. 
The latter feared that this would generate a precedent eventually leading to commitments for 
developing countries (Grubb 1999, pp. 251f.).  
In subsequent years, the distinction between Annex I and non-Annex I countries became more 
and more rigid (Höhne et al. 1997, p. 9, Höhne 2005, p. 37). Contentious issues such as the 
financing of mitigation and adaptation in developing countries, further reporting 
                                                 
1
 ‗Sinks‘ are natural carbon stores that sequester carbon from the atmosphere (forests, soils and oceans). 
2
 While the US is listed in Annex B, it did not ratify the Protocol. Turkey is the only Annex I country that ratified 
the Kyoto Protocol, but, for exceptional reasons, is not included in Annex B (UNFCCC n/d). 
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requirements, the accounting of avoided deforestation, and the adoption of future 
commitments, all were discussed along these lines. As Gupta (2010, p. 641) describes it, ―the 
division of the world into developed and developing (based on OECD membership) was 
amateurish—there were no clear criteria for this division, and this has proved to be a major 
stumbling block in subsequent periods as countries resisted their inclusion in Annex I (e.g., 
Turkey) or are reluctant to change their status subsequently‖.  
Thus, initially, listing countries in Annex I was meant to be used only as an interim vehicle to 
differentiate the emission reduction and related reporting commitments. However, in practice 
it may have created a lasting divide between two static country groups.  
In the framework of international climate negotiations, a number of other country groups have 
become relevant, too. As opposed to Annex I, these groups are not defined by the Convention 
itself. Their main purpose is to exchange information between like-minded countries, to 
increase their negotiating power by expressing joint positions, and to ease the burden of small 
and / or poor countries that may not be able to send a sufficient number of delegates to be 
represented in all the different negotiation groups for discussing the different policy issues at 
stake. In some cases, such groups have reached special treatment for particular policy issues. 
Both the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and the group of Small Island Developing States 
(SIDSs) are explicitly recognized as particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, 
and thus enjoy certain specific provisions. For instance, there is a special seat being reserved 
for SIDSs on the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), or a waiver 
of registration cost for CDM projects in LDCs.  
Some of these groups are well-established regional or political country groupings such as the 
EU, the G77 and China, OPEC or the LDCs that also act as groups in other international fora. 
There also are an African group, a Central Asian group (CACAM) and two Latin American 
groups, the Bolivarian Alliance of Latin American Countries (ALBA) and the Central 
American Integration group (Sistema de Integración Centroamericana, SICA), whereby the 
former is based on ideological, the second on geographical grounds. Other groups have 
formed specifically in the climate negotiation process, driven by joint interests in this field, 
such as the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS
3
), a group of the large emerging countries 
Brazil, China, India and South Africa (BASIC), or the Umbrella group – an alliance of 
industrialized countries in favor of market based mechanisms rather than regulation.  
While there are a large number of (partially overlapping) groups within non-Annex I, and also 
a few groups within Annex I, only a single (small) group bridges the gap between these two. 
This is the Environmental Integrity Group composed of South Korea, Mexico, Liechtenstein 
and Switzerland. An overview of all the different groups is provided in Figure 1. 
                                                 
3
 AOSIS is an ad hoc negotiating coalition that represents the interests of SIDSs. While both groups are very 
similar, they are not identical: the UN list of SIDSs includes Bahrain and several non-UN members and associate 
members of the regional commissions that are not members of AOSIS. 
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Figure 1: Country coalitions within the UNFCCC 
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We consider these groups (other than Annex I or non-Annex I) as natural coalitions that have 
been built due to pre-existing common interests or characteristics of their member countries.
 4
 
As such, they are not relevant for our ―constructed peer-group‖ hypothesis, which tries to 
explain the effect on the negotiations of groups that have been created by the regime itself. 
However, since in the negotiation process many countries – especially the smaller ones – tend 
to express their opinions through the coalitions they are member of, rather than through 
statements of their own, all these coalitions are of high relevance for the analysis of the 
negotiation process. When assessing the determinants of supportive statements among 
participants of the negotiation process in later sections of this paper, we will therefore include 
these country coalitions as additional observations. Technically, we will treat them as if they 
were additional countries with characteristics (income, emissions, etc.) derived from the 
values of their member countries. We do this because we assume that these coalitions will 
represent the preferences of their members, and that these preferences are best summarized by 
the mean of member country characteristics. 
Before we get to the empirical analysis, however, we need to provide a theoretical framework 
for our analysis. In the following section, we will therefore outline our ―constructed peer-
group‖ hypothesis on how institutionalized country groupings may influence the negotiation 
process. To motivate this hypothesis, we will draw on more general theories related to 
incentives and psychological motivations for cooperation.  
 
3. Why institutionalized groupings could affect the future negotiation process: the 
constructed peer-group hypothesis 
Clearly, country characteristics and related preferences affect the positions they will take up 
in the negotiation process, the statements they will approve of, and, eventually, the outcomes 
of the negotiation process. Countries within distinct groups usually share a certain number of 
economic, political or geographical characteristics, and these similarities lead to common 
positions on certain aspects of the policy issues at stake.  
Our theoretical idea now is that, over and above the effect of similarities in country 
characteristics and related preferences, the existence of institutionalized country groupings 
may have an effect of its own. We call this the ―constructed peer-group‖ hypothesis. The 
construction of these groups by the regime itself (in contrast to the natural coalitions 
described above) results in new commonalities among their member countries, which lead to 
a group identity similar to that of a peer group. This in turn affects the negotiation dynamics, 
and leads eventually to the persistence of these constructed groups, even for other purposes 
than those intended initially. We thus expect path dependence between initial institutional 
decisions and later negotiation structures and dynamics. In the climate change context, it 
seems that the creation of the Annex I list of countries with specific emission reduction and 
reporting commitments, and the emergence of the non-Annex I group without them, have 
made subsequent negotiation rounds reinforce the differences between these two groups more 
and more across different policy areas.  
Our hypothesis is based on theoretical considerations about how groups behave in 
negotiations or similar situations, and about how the creation of new groups generates new 
incentives which, in turn, influence negotiation dynamics. We consider three arguments that 
                                                 
4
 In the interest of clarity, we will continue to use the term ―coalitions‖ when we further refer to these groups, 
while the term ―groups‖ will be confined to Annex I and non-Annex I.  
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back up our hypothesis: (i) group psychology, (ii) a changed negotiation structure resulting 
from the existence of groups, and (iii) new incentives created by the new groups. Note that we 
do not seek to assess the relative importance of any of these arguments. Rather, we consider 
that all of them can motivate our constructed peer-group hypothesis, and it may well be that 
all of them are similarly relevant for the phenomenon at hand.  
 
(i) Group psychology 
Countries in a given group will meet more often and exchange positions. As they already 
share some common characteristics, they will feel more closely related. The reduced number 
of participants also facilitates the creation of personal relationships between country 
representatives and the emergence of social capital (Coleman 1990; Schimmelfennig et al. 
2006). In the words of Mantzavinos et al. (2004, p. 76): ―individuals in a given sociocultural 
environment continually communicate with other individuals while trying to solve their 
problems. The direct result of this communication is the formation of shared mental models‖, 
which lead to a common understanding of reality. Through experiments, social psychologists 
have indeed shown that group discussion increases the chances of cooperation (Orbell et al. 
1988). Researchers of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) also argue that membership of 
IGOs creates network ties between countries, provides communication channels that allow 
them to share information about interests and intentions, and generate a sense of mutual 
identity that leads to cooperation (see e.g. Keohane 1986; Caporaso 1992; Russet et al. 1998; 
Young 1999; and Dorussen and Ward 2008).  
This all induces a more trustful atmosphere conducive to fruitful deliberations. Consensus will 
be found more easily within smaller groups than within UNFCCC members as a whole. Once 
a group exists, one may thus expect that these factors reinforce cohesion among members, and 
a unified group position is likely to emerge. If, in addition, the group is challenged from the 
outside, questioning the very foundations and the ―raison d‘être‖ of the group, this may even 
further weld together its members.  
The smaller the group and the clearer the similarities of members‘ preferences at the outset, 
the stronger should be these effects. This is in line with Mantzavinos et al.‘s (2004) argument 
that trust is more likely to exist in smaller groups than in larger societies, and with Olson‘s 
(1971) theory that smaller groups are more able to organize for tackling collective action 
problems.  
A coalition like AOSIS including only countries that are extremely vulnerable to climate 
change, appears to be a good example. At the same time, the arguments also appear plausible 
for bigger and less homogeneous groups, even if the effects may be somewhat reduced: The 
creation of Annex I artificially split UNFCCC members into two distinct groups: Annex I and 
non-Annex I countries. It thereby generated two separate fora for discussion in addition to the 
already existing ones. Since non-Annex I countries enjoy some privileges (no own 
commitments, external funding for their own mitigation and adaptation activities), their status 
has been challenged repeatedly in the past. This resulted in a strong response by the group as 
a whole. The above mentioned developing country resistance against Argentina or 
Kazakhstan‘s proposed move from non-Annex I to Annex I is a key example. More generally, 
Leela Raina‘s statements on reasons ―not to date an Annex I guy‖ (quoted in the introduction 
of this paper) neatly show the psychological and ideological divide which has emerged 
between the two groups. 
 
 9 
(ii) Changed negotiation structure  
Ever since Downs‘ (1957) seminal work on the ―Economic Theory of Democracy‖, it has 
been well established in both political science and economics that the electoral system 
influences the positions adopted by political parties. Within Downs‘ model itself, it can be 
shown that the voting process will no more lead to the adoption of the median voter position, 
if, prior to the general election, the party positions have to be accepted by a majority of the 
party members – at least if these members are not evenly distributed over the policy space, but 
clustered at two different ends due to ideological preferences. In this context, the party 
positions adopted will typically lie around the median position within each party, rather than 
at the median of the overall population. During the general elections, voters will then be 
confronted with two distinct party propositions, and one of these will eventually be accepted. 
As opposed to the median voter scenario, this outcome will correspond to the preferences of 
some voters on one or the other side of the ideological spectrum, rather than to the 
intermediate preferences of the median voter.  
Group-wise discussions in international negotiation processes can be conceived as analogous 
to primary elections within parties, where instead of party members we have the countries 
belonging to a specific group, and instead of parties we have the groups themselves. 
Institutionalized groupings thus affect the structure of the negotiation process. Rather than 
having all participants deliberate jointly about the issues at stake, the formation of opinions 
then happens at an earlier stage within the different groups. If these groups are clustered 
around different positions in the policy space, and if group discussions in the first stage lead 
to relatively fixed positions fed into the overall negotiation process in the second stage, 
reaching consensus there will become much more difficult.  
Just as the discussion on group psychology, within the UNFCCC this argument refers to all 
groups in a similar way, and is especially relevant for the regional or political coalitions such 
as AOSIS or the G77, who hold regular meetings to coordinate positions during the 
negotiation rounds. However, again, the formation of new groups such as Annex I and non-
Annex I can amplify the effect, simply by increasing the total number of groups. 
 
(iii) New incentives 
New incentives are generated when group formation goes hand in hand with specific 
privileges attached to group membership. For all members of the group, the protection of 
these privileges becomes a new and common objective. For instance, groupings initially 
granted certain exemptions from economic or financial adjustment obligations will have an 
incentive to jointly lobby for the continuation of this preferential treatment in subsequent 
negotiation rounds, or for the expansion of the preferential treatment to other issue areas. New 
incentives can also work in the opposite direction: countries in the group with financial or 
environmental obligations will lobby for the abolishment of the preferential treatment, or for 
increased flexibility for fulfilling their commitments. In both cases, the common objective 
strengthens cohesion within the group.  
While within the UNFCCC group psychology and the changed negotiation structure were 
relevant for all groups and the creation of the Annex I – non-Annex I distinction simply 
amplified their number, new incentives only arose in the context of Annex I – non-Annex I. 
This is because membership in Annex I was linked, from the beginning, to specific 
responsibilities and duties while non-membership was linked to privileges. For non-Annex I 
members, this created new stakes, the idea that concessions obtained at one point should not 
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be weakened, and thus the incentive to fight for the perpetuation of the status quo (Gupta 
2010). This fight takes place by the group as a whole since the demand for the change in 
status of individual non-Annex I countries is perceived as a threat for many others. They fear 
that any weakening of the once-defined dividing line between countries with and without 
commitments will pave the way for further pressure on developing countries, for requests 
with respect to more and more countries taking up commitments, and eventually, for a 
suppression of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.  
Again, resistance against Argentina or Kazakhstan‘s proposed move from non-Annex I to 
Annex I could be quoted here as an example. Another example is the deadlock of negotiations 
about mitigation commitments for China. No serious discussion has been possible in this area 
so far, despite the fact that, ever since 2007, China has the highest CO2 emissions of any 
country in the world (Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 2008), and despite 
China‘s steadily rising level of per capita income that will soon reach the level of the poorer 
countries in Annex I (e.g., the Ukraine) (World Bank 2009). A further example from the 
recent negotiation dynamics is the fierce defense, by non-Annex I countries, of the 
continuation of the Kyoto Protocol that sets binding emission reduction commitments only for 
the developed countries, in contrast to the preference of these last ones for a complete new 
protocol with a larger set of countries taking on commitments (see e.g. Rajamani 2009 and 
Reuters 2010).  
Our incentives argument also goes in the direction of North‘s (1994) theories on institutional 
change and path dependence. He argues that the ―political and economic organizations that 
have come into existence in consequence of the institutional matrix typically have a stake in 
perpetuating the existing framework‖ (p. 7), due not only to the fact that actors rationalize the 
existing institutional framework and thus favor policies that keep it in place (the mental 
models of Mantzavinos et al., op.cit.), but also because of complementarities, economies of 
scope, network externalities, and the own interests of the existing organizations. As Pierson 
(2000, p. 255) points out, ―Established institutions generate powerful inducements that 
reinforce their own stability and further development‖.  
Finally, the theory of stability of coalitions further substantiates our incentives argument: 
Incentives for free-riding in treaties dealing with the provision of public goods (such as 
pollution abatement) increase as the size of the coalition increases, because the opportunity 
costs of not abating grow (e.g. Eyckmans and Finus 2007). In our case, once the Annex I 
group of countries with abatement obligations was established, and in the absence of rules for 
graduating into this group automatically, no single country has an incentive to join Annex I 
and commit to reducing emissions, because its individual costs of abatement are larger than 
the mitigation benefits it derives from committing. 
We have now shown the different channels through which the creation of institutionalized 
groups may affect the dynamics of the negotiation process. While the group psychology and 
the negotiation structure argument should be relevant for all groups, including regional or 
political coalitions, the new incentives argument is relevant only in the context of 
Annex I / non-Annex I. Only there, new stakes have been generated along with the creation of 
the group. 
These additional stakes which generate a new unifying objective are important for the 
empirical identification of the group effect as opposed to the effect of country characteristics 
and related preferences. As long as group building only generates stronger cohesion among 
countries anyway linked by homogeneous preferences, the impact of the group itself will be 
difficult to identify. The definition of Annex I, however, has generated two groups that are not 
 11 
overly homogeneous, so that we find some overlap in the relevant country characteristics 
between the two groups (see e.g. Gupta 2000 for a detailed description of the differences and 
commonalities among developing countries in the climate regime). While membership of 
Annex I (and non-Annex I) was not randomly selected, but rather decided in terms of 
greenhouse gas emissions levels and levels of economic development, these two groups are 
themselves not homogeneous in many respects, including individual countries‘ greenhouse 
gas emissions, income, or vulnerability to climate change (see Table 2 for a comparison of 
country characteristics between Annex I and non-Annex I). This heterogeneity results in 
varying interests and preferences regarding the climate regime within each group. Yet, based 
on the above theoretical arguments, we hypothesize that the preferential treatment of non-
Annex I countries has generated a strong common objective for all these countries that 
opposes them to Annex I, and vice versa. This makes countries within each group overcome 
their differences in preferences in order to reach a stronger negotiation position in pursuit of 
the common goal of keeping (or eliminating) the preferential treatment. Using an appropriate 
econometric estimation approach should enable us to observe this distinct ―constructed peer-
group‖ effect suggested in our theoretical analysis.  
 
4. Data and variables 
In order to test whether Annex I membership plays a role – over and above country 
characteristics and related preferences – for countries‘ negotiation behavior, we need to define 
both, our understanding of ―negotiation behavior‖, and the relevant country characteristics. 
Negotiation behavior encompasses many different aspects of deliberation and strategic action 
in the negotiation process. To be able to handle the concept in our empirical analysis we 
narrow it down to one measurable dimension: statements by countries declaring support to 
other countries‘ previous statements. We assume that openly expressing support for a 
country‘s previous statements indicates closeness in terms of negotiation positions.  
To generate the corresponding variable, we hand-code the negotiation reports published in the 
Earth Negotiations Bulletins (ENB) (International Institute for Sustainable Development, 
IISD 2007-2009) for the UNFCCC Conferences of the Parties (COPs) and intersessional 
negotiation meetings from December 2007 to December 2009. The ENBs provide very 
detailed daily reports of the negotiations. For all meetings that are open to observers, the 
reports contain summaries of statements made by the different countries, and of reactions by 
others. Our variable on statements by country i supporting country‘s j positions is a dummy 
that is coded 1 whenever a country is reported to ‗support‘ another country‘s statement, to 
‗associate itself‘ with this statement, to say something ―with‖ another country, or to even 
‗speak on behalf‘ of another country. 
As an example, a passage on the ENB reporting the negotiations on 5
th
 June 2008 says ―The 
EU, supported by JAPAN, proposed a pilot phase approach‖ (on carbon, capture and storage). 
To create the dependent variable that measures support for the EU, we code this unit of text as 
1 in terms of support by Japan for the EU. We do the same for the negotiations between 
December 2007 and December 2009, so that we have a variable counting how many times 
Japan (and each of the 200 ―countries‖5 participating in the negotiations) expressed support 
                                                 
5
 As explained in Section 2, countries are complemented by coalitions in our list of observations. For simplicity, 
we will not always refer to both terms, and the term ―countries‖ is meant to encompass both, actual countries and 
coalitions, whenever coalitions are not stated separately.  
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for the EU. This variable is then normalized in terms of how often the EU itself said 
something in the negotiations (by dividing by the total number of EU interventions). In this 
way, we avoid the bias that would be caused by the countries‘ different levels of participation 
in the multilateral negotiations. Otherwise, much higher levels of supportiveness for the EU‘s 
positions would be observed than for a country like Croatia (even if both have similar 
positions), just because Croatia only participated actively four times in the open negotiations 
(against 540 interventions by the EU), so that other countries almost never had the 
opportunity to express support for Croatia‘s interventions.  
We did not just generate a dependent variable that measures support towards the EU, but did 
it also for eight other distinct countries and coalitions that are among the most active in the 
negotiation process, and that represent a wide variety of interests and positions. This makes 
our coding more reliable than for countries that do not intervene much in plenary. These nine 
countries and coalitions are: the EU, the US and Russia, who are among the major actors in 
Annex I; Tuvalu, AOSIS and the African Group, who represent ambitious developing 
countries with low per capita emissions but high vulnerability to climate change; China and 
India, who are among the most active emerging economies in the UNFCCC; and Saudi 
Arabia, who as an oil-exporting economy represents special interests within the non-Annex I 
group. Russia, the US and, above all, Saudi Arabia are known as laggards, while the EU tries 
to portray itself as a climate frontrunner. Table A1 in Appendix A lists the 25 countries and 
coalitions that were most active in the climate negotiations in the period of analysis, 
highlighting the ones that were chosen for the empirical analysis. 
We treat the information obtained as nine different dependent variables. We will thus perform 
separate regressions on how frequently each of these nine countries/coalitions has been 
supported by all the other countries participating in the negotiation meetings. 
One of the limitations of the dataset is that it only covers the negotiation meetings that are 
open to external observers. Our analysis works only under the assumption that the behavior of 
parties in the open negotiations represents their behavior in all meetings. We believe that this 
assumption is plausible. The real decisions are arguably taken in closed or informal 
negotiation meetings, for which no information on what individual parties have said is 
available. However, the open meetings are generally used to either introduce the topics that 
will be discussed during the following week of negotiations, or summarize and debate the 
progress made during the past negotiation days. Thus, positions expressed in the closed 
negotiation meetings are not expected to deviate substantially from the ones observed in open 
meetings.  
The conference days covered by our coding add up to around 90 days of negotiation from Bali 
2007 to Copenhagen 2009. As explained in the EU example above, we aggregate the 
information on statements on all these conference days into a single observation per country. 
To do so, we sum up all statements by country i in support of country j‘s position. To make 
the variables more easily comparable across the nine countries supported, we then consider 
this sum as a percentage of total interventions of country j. 
Formally, if we define zij as the dummy variable for a statement made by country i in support 
of country j‘s position, and nj as the total number of statements by country j during the 
negotiation rounds between December 2007 and December 2009, we can express our 
dependent variables, i.e. the percentage of supportive statements, as: 
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Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics for these dependent variables. It shows that the 
average share of statements supporting the selected countries ranges from 0.36% of all US 
statements to 0.81% of all Chinese statements. These small numbers are driven by the fact 
that the most common behavior for most countries is not to react at all on some other 
countries‘ statements. However, as can be seen in the last column, some individual countries 
have lent considerable support to some others. Most prominently, some countries have 
explicitly expressed support for 20% of the statements made by India or China respectively.  
As we are interested in the effect of Annex I (or non-Annex I) membership on these 
supportive statements, our central independent variable is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if a country is listed in Annex I of the Convention.  
 
Table 1: Statements declaring support for selected countries’ positions (as % of their 
number of interventions) 
Percentage of 
statements supporting: Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
USA 200 0.36 1.49 0 10.50 
Tuvalu 200 0.38 1.02 0 7.14 
EU 200 0.39 1.26 0 8.89 
AOSIS 200 0.46 1.35 0 10.39 
Russia 200 0.48 1.82 0 12.86 
African Group 200 0.52 1.66 0 12.12 
Saudi Arabia 200 0.54 1.60 0 15.42 
India 200 0.60 1.92 0 20.00 
China 200 0.82 2.46 0 20.68 
Note: Countries / coalitions sorted by mean support. 
 
As discussed above, the effect of this variable can be easily confounded with the effect of a 
number of country characteristics that simultaneously influence country preferences and 
Annex I or non-Annex I membership. The most prominent variables to be considered in this 
context are those that capture the intentions behind the construction of Annex I, namely a 
differentiated treatment depending on income and emissions: both UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol rely on the principle of ―common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities‖, which, broadly interpreted, entails that countries should act to prevent climate 
change according to their contribution for causing the problem (emissions) and to their 
capability to act (income) (Gupta 2010). Income is expressed in terms of GNI per capita, as 
this measure better incorporates the notion of equity and fairness entailed in the Convention‘s 
principles than gross income. For emissions we try two specifications, total CO2 emissions 
and CO2 emissions per capita, as there are different theoretical arguments regarding which of 
these two measures should be used (see e.g. Ott et al. 2004; Karousakis et al. 2008; and 
Bakker et al. 2009).  
In addition, we consider a large number of variables that capture other potentially relevant 
country characteristics. Country size (in terms of population) and education (measured as net 
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secondary enrollment) are used to capture the role of country power resources and bargaining 
skills of its delegation in influencing the negotiations (Snyder and Diesing 1977; Keohane and 
Nye 1989; Mastenbroek 1991; Steinberg 2002). Three other variables are included to more 
specifically model the delegation‘s negotiation skills: dummy variables indicating whether the 
country‘s national or official language is English or French, as language is frequently 
considered a barrier for communication and understanding during the technically complex 
climate negotiations; the number of memberships to international agreements, as an indicator 
of the country‘s experience and activity in other international negotiation settings; and the 
number of oral interventions during the UNFCCC negotiations between December 2007 and 
December 2009, as a direct measure of activity within the climate regime. 
Measures of political freedom and government ideology (left-right) are used to control for the 
possible effect of ideological influences on country positions and behavior in the negotiations 
(for example, left-wing Latin American administrations such as Bolivia and Venezuela tend to 
use the UNFCCC as a forum to disassociate themselves from what they consider as neoliberal 
imperialism, see Vihma 2010, pp. 7-8). 
Two indicators of vulnerability to climate change (the composite Environmental Vulnerability 
Index
6
 and the relevance of income from agriculture as % of GDP), as well as characteristics 
related to potential benefits from specific areas under discussion (such as the use of flexible 
market mechanisms, the accounting of forests as sinks, the use of renewable energy, or the 
amount of coal and oil exported by a country) are also included to control for issue-specific 
interests of parties.  
Finally, we consider the role of bilateral political and/or economic relationships in other areas 
such as aid, trade, colonial past or voting in the UN General Assembly, as these variables 
might influence the relationships of parties in the climate regime and thus their behavior in 
terms of agreeing with other parties‘ positions.  
If not otherwise indicated, all of these variables are measured for the year 2007, the start of 
the coding period for our dependent variables. For a more detailed description of all variables, 
their descriptive statistics and data sources, see Table A2 in Appendix A. 
Since country coalitions are included as single observations just as individual countries, we 
generate values for the respective variables by using the averages of their member countries. 
Only in the case of population, which is included to represent a country‘s power, we use the 
sum rather than the average to reflect the overall size of the coalition.  
The available information is generally rather complete. For a few variables, we replace some 
missing values by linear imputation using related indicators (such as gross secondary 
enrolment to impute for net secondary enrolment). 
Table 2 compares the country characteristics of Annex I and non-Annex I countries on the 
basis of selected variables considered as potentially relevant controls. A full set of variables 
with detailed descriptions and sources is provided in Appendix A of this paper.  
 
 
                                                 
6
 The Environmental Vulnerability Index (EVI), developed by the South Pacific Applied Geoscience 
Commission and the United Nations Environment Programme, combines 50 indicators to estimate countries‘ 
vulnerability of the environment to future shocks. It does not include indicators for the social or economic 
vulnerability.   
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Table 2: Comparing country characteristics for Annex I and non-Annex I countries 
 Annex I Non-Annex I 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Country size, political and econ. development 
Population (millions) 56.73 131.39 0.03 680.10 96.67 576.95 0.002 6861.37 
GDP (current US$ 
trillions) 
1.04 2.29 0.004 14.00 0.09 0.33 0 3.4 
GNI per capita (int. $ 
thousands, PPP) 
30.34 17.25 6.83 107.55 7.91 11.40 0.28 78.85 
Freedom House index  
(1=free,..., 7=unfree) 
1.43 1.12 1 6.50 3.73 1.80 1 7.00 
Net secondary 
enrolment (%) 
88.67 6.90 69.50 103.11 58.07 23.00 2.6 104.54 
Emissions 
CO2 emissions  
(giga tonnes) 
0.38 0.94 0.002 5.8 0.10 0.55 0.000004 6.5 
CO2 emissions 
(t/capita) 
9.14 4.33 3.42 23.52 3.98 8.22 0.02 76.80 
 
Vulnerability 
Value added from 
agriculture/GDP (%) 
3.94 3.16 0 13.41 17.79 14.70 0 76.90 
Climate change 
vulnerability,  
EVI index 
3.81 0.62 2.69 5.50 3.33 0.77 1.67 5.13 
(EVI index/GDP per 
capita)*10³ 
0.16 0.10 0.04 0.57 1.60 2.89 0.04 29.72 
Factors of interest for specific areas under discussion 
Use of flexible 
mechanisms 
0.14 0.62 0 4.04 0.05 0.32 0 4.03 
Proportion of land area 
covered by forests 
0.32 0.17 0 0.74 0.29 0.24 0 0.95 
Renewable energy 
production in % of 
energy consumption 
0.75 1.44 0 7.70 0.02 0.12 0 1.18 
 
Negotiation experience and activity 
Participation in int. 
agreements (no of 
memberships) 
79.31 21.91 20 125.00 56.93 17.14 16 95.00 
No of interventions in 
UNFCCC, Dec. 2007-
Dec. 2009 
53.35 113.60 0 540 23.17 54.26 0 382 
 
 
As demonstrated by the comparison in Table 2, on average, Annex I and non-Annex I 
countries do indeed differ on many characteristics that may be relevant for their preferences 
and thus, for their statements in the negotiations. As expected, on average, Annex I countries 
are considerably more advanced economically and in terms of human capital (secondary 
enrollment). They also tend to have a more democratic regime as indicated by a considerably 
lower Freedom House index. Emission levels are higher both in absolute terms and per capita, 
and vulnerability to climate change is less prevalent, at least when considered relative to 
income or in terms of the relevance of the agricultural sector. Annex I countries also make 
 16 
more frequent use of flexible mechanisms and of renewable energy. They tend to be members 
of a higher number of international agreements and also participate more actively in the 
debates within the UNFCCC conferences.  
Despite all these differences between the mean values of the variables for Annex I and non-
Annex I countries, the range of values for these variables (minimum and maximum values in 
the last two columns for each of the two groups) indicates that there is a wide overlap. Within 
Annex I, GNI per capita for instance, ranges from 6830$ (PPP) for Ukraine to 109170$ for 
Liechtenstein. Within non-Annex I, it ranges from 280$ for Liberia to 80090$ for Qatar. 
While the poorest non-Annex I countries and the richest Annex I countries do not find an 
appropriate match, a number of countries have incomes that are comparable between the two 
groups. The same is true for all other variables in Table 2. Given the large variety of countries 
in non-Annex I the range of country characteristics is frequently wider there than for Annex I. 
For different variables, this implies that both the smallest and the largest values are to be 
found in non-Annex I countries. As non-Annex I also includes all oil-exporting Arab 
countries, this is notably the case for per capita CO2 emissions.  
All in all, the comparison of country characteristics in Table 2 highlights the importance of an 
appropriate control for these factors in our empirical estimation strategy. Moreover, it 
indicates that the overlap between both groups should be strong enough to allow us to refine 
the estimation strategy by using a set of truly comparable countries, in order to test the 
robustness of our results. 
 
5. The impact of Annex I membership: Estimation methods and results 
In order to test the effect of Annex I membership we first run multivariate regressions 
controlling for a large number of context variables. We use a tobit model to take into account 
that the percentage of joint statements is censored at zero (a share smaller than zero cannot be 
observed)
7
. In a second step, we use propensity score matching to test the robustness of our 
results. 
In principle, the advantage of regression analysis is that we get an impression of the effect of 
our control variables, along with our explanatory variable, so that we can get an idea of the 
plausibility of the model as a whole. Unfortunately, it turns out that correlations between the 
different right hand side variables are very high (see Appendix A, Table A3) so that we can 
make sense of the coefficients only when we avoid entering too many variables at once. Since 
all of the variables in Appendix A, Table A2 appear theoretically relevant as controls we 
revert to a mechanical forward selection procedure including all variables with p-values  0.2. 
Only our central dummy variable for Annex I membership is included per default, 
independently of this threshold.  
Table 3 presents the results for these parsimonious regressions. Numbers represent the 
marginal effects estimated at the means of the sample, i.e.: 
 
 ,      with yij=0 if xi‘b + ui ≤ 0, and yij =xi‘b+ui otherwise. 
                                                 
7
 While theoretically the dependent variable is also censored at 100 (a percentage higher than 100 cannot be 
observed), all our observations are well below this threshold, so that we do not need to account for this upper 
censoring. 
i
ij
x
yE

 )(
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Where xi denotes the vector of right hand side variables for country i in regression j 
(considering the statements by country i in support of the positions of country j), and ui is the 
corresponding error term.
8
 
 
Table 3: Determinants of supportive statements (in %)  
 Support for: 
 
EU 
 
USA 
 
Russia 
 
AOSIS 
 
African 
Group 
Tuvalu 
 
China 
  
India 
 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Annex I 0.160  0.185  0.757  -0.245 *** -0.337 *** -0.238 *** -0.280 *** -0.412 *** -0.084  
No of interventions 0.005 *** 0.000 0.001 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.004 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.004 *** 
Population 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 ** 0.000 ** 0.000 
GNI per capita     -0.001       0.005 *   0.008 *** 
Education 0.003 **   0.001 -0.004 **           
English language 0.213 *** 0.017         0.092     
French language             -0.131 ** -0.233 *** -0.145 *** 
Intl. agreements       0.004 *     0.006 *** 0.009 *** 0.004 ** 
CO2 emissions       0.174 *** 0.236 *** 0.051 0.484 *** 0.396 *** 0.197 ** 
Freedom House   -0.005   -0.049 **   -0.061 ***       
Right government                   
Left government   0.007         0.081   0.132 * 
Agriculture   0.001               
Vulnerability -0.120 *** -0.013 -0.024             
UNGA voting 0.395           -1.028 *   -1.871 *** 
Colony   0.001 -0.025             
Fossil exports       -0.635   -0.595       
Forests   -0.027 -0.136   0.298       -0.275 * 
Renewables   -0.024 -0.090       -0.664 *** -0.426 ** -0.529 *** 
Flexible mechanisms   0.009   0.110       0.158   
Trade with USA   0.051               
Aid from USA   -1.890               
Trade Saudi Arabia                                 -0.894 * 
Observations 178  177  178  178  178  178  178  178  168  
Left censored 125  145  158  130  136  138  119  124  116  
Log likelihood -108  -62  -67  -116  -138  -105  -142  -146  -121  
Pseudo R² 0.39  0.54  0.38  0.38  0.23  0.33  0.41  0.32  0.39  
Notes: Tobit regressions, values are for marginal effects, with yij=0 if xi‘b + ui ≤ 0, and yij =xi‘b+ui otherwise. 
Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. Constant not reported. For 
variable descriptions, see Appendix A, Table A2. 
 
Table 3 shows that even after controlling for a number of relevant control variables, 
membership to Annex I remains significant in five out of nine regressions. The direction of 
the effect of membership to Annex I is in all cases as expected: coefficients are positive for 
the EU, USA and Russia, and negative (and statistically significant) for AOSIS, the African 
Group, Tuvalu, China and India. The effect is negative but not significant in the case of Saudi 
                                                 
8
 In Appendix B, Tables B2-B3 we also report marginal effects for strictly positive values of yij. Such marginal 
effects show the effect of our explanatory variables on the percentage of statements supporting country j by those 
countries i that at least expressed such support once. In these models the observed relationships are even stronger 
than in Table 3 above, both substantively and in terms of statistical significance. 
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Arabia. This makes sense, since it implies that, after controlling for country characteristics 
that may make their preferences and positions similar, Annex I members more frequently 
support other Annex I members (EU, USA and Russia), but less frequently support those 
countries or coalitions that are not part of Annex I (all the others). The size of the coefficients 
is substantial in several cases. For example, the expected percentage of statements supporting 
Russia is 0.76 percentage points larger for Annex I countries than for non-Annex I countries. 
This corresponds to about 42% of a standard deviation. In the case of AOSIS, the African 
Group, Tuvalu and India, the percentage of supportive statements is about 20% of a standard 
deviation smaller for Annex I countries than for non-Annex I ones. In other regressions 
coefficients are smaller, but still non-negligible. In the case of Saudi Arabia, both the size of 
the coefficient and the statistical significance indicate that there is no important effect of 
being (or not being) in Annex I on the percentage of supportive statements. This is in line 
with the observation that Saudi Arabia frequently blocks progress in the negotiations, and thus 
neither Annex I nor most non-Annex I countries usually support its views. Saudi Arabia fears 
that climate change mitigation efforts may affect its oil-based economy, and also represents 
the view that measures to compensate countries for the negative effects of climate change 
policies should be considered as measures to adapt to climate change, position that is not 
shared by most other developing countries. 
The signs of our central control variables correspond to what we should expect: Countries 
who generally intervene more frequently in the negotiation process also do so more frequently 
in support of other countries‘ arguments, so that the coefficient for the number of 
interventions is positive in all regressions. Similarly, English speaking, larger countries and 
countries with a higher level of education and with more participation in international 
organizations (with better negotiation skills and more political power, and probably also 
represented by a higher number of negotiators) also tend to make more supportive statements 
(in the case of AOSIS, the negative sign of the education variable may be related to a high 
support by other poor and vulnerable countries, such as Least Developed Countries, which 
also display low levels of education).
9
 The fact that countries with more CO2 emissions – thus 
those that are more responsible for causing climate change – appear to show more support for 
the non-Annex I countries among our sample (AOSIS, Africa, Tuvalu, China, India), may be 
related to the fact that the largest emitter – China – belongs to non-Annex I, and thus 
frequently supports the positions of peers in this group.  
In addition, we observe that more democratic countries (i.e. countries with a lower value on 
the Freedom House index) tend to support AOSIS and Tuvalu more. This may be related with 
public opinion in these countries expressing concern about the effects of climate change on 
small island states. More vulnerable countries lend less support to the EU, USA and Russia, 
probably due to their – in the view of vulnerable countries – insufficient commitment towards 
deeper cuts in emissions. Exporters of coal and oil lend less support to the vulnerable small 
island states, and countries with a high share of renewable energy (solar, tide, wave and wind) 
in national energy consumption tend to lend less support to China, India and Saudi Arabia, 
which is not surprising, since these are mainly European and other Annex I countries. It is 
also interesting that the variable measuring agreement with the US in the UN General 
Assembly, which is highly correlated with our Annex I dummy (see Table A3 in the 
Appendix), has a large negative effect on support for China and Saudi Arabia, but that at least 
                                                 
9
 While the overall number of interventions is already controlled for, these variables may convey additional 
information on the potential to be active in the negotiations. They may, for instance, capture some non-linearities 
related to the overall number of interventions. 
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for China, the effect of Annex I is still noticeable and significant. We do not find a clear 
pattern for the other control variables.  
Thus, overall, the results of the regressions appear reasonable and increase our confidence in 
the model as a whole and in the appropriateness of the selected controls. A table with results 
for a more complete set of right hand side variables is provided for comparison in Appendix B 
(Table B1). Comparing the log likelihood and the pseudo R² shows that the inclusion of 
further variables does not substantially improve the overall regression fit, which is confirmed 
through Wald and likelihood ratio tests. Due to the strong multicollinearity, many variables 
become insignificant individually (for a correlation matrix, see Appendix A, Table A3). 
However, our most relevant variable indicating the effect of Annex I membership is still 
significant (with the expected sign) in five of the regressions.  
Other robustness checks included using total GDP instead of total population, CO2 emissions 
per capita instead of total emissions, and generating the population value for the country 
coalitions using the mean (as for other variables) rather than the sum. The results for our main 
explanatory variable, Annex I, remain robust to these different specifications, and are 
available on request.  
The tobit regressions thus clearly indicate a role of Annex I versus non-Annex I membership 
that holds over and above the influence of relevant country characteristics. However, a 
problem with our regression analysis may be undue extrapolation that leads us to compare 
countries that are not really fully comparable. As discussed above and illustrated in Table 2 a 
number of countries within Annex I and non-Annex I do not find appropriate matches in the 
other group and regression results may be problematic if they are driven by these 
observations. In addition, especially in Table 3, the preoccupation with multicollinearity may 
have led us to omit relevant control variables thereby trading off the unbiased coefficients of 
the Annex I dummy against the overall interpretability of regression results. And finally, 
besides the assumptions of normality of residuals and homoscedasticity, which are critical for 
the tobit to be consistent, we also assumed a linear relationship between the percentage of 
supportive statements and the right hand side variables while our theoretical framework 
provides no indication that the relationship should really be linear. 
To take these issues into account, we now proceed with a nonparametric matching analysis. 
Following the terminology of the treatment evaluation literature, Annex I membership is 
considered as a ―treatment‖ to which the country (or country coalition) is subjected. The 
empirical strategy attempts to select other countries as controls that correspond in their 
characteristics to those countries that received the treatment. If all variables simultaneously 
influencing the treatment decision (i.e. the decision about which country is part of Annex I) 
and the share of joint statements are taken into account, the ―selection on observables‖ 
(Heckman and Robb 1985) or ―conditional independence‖ (Lechner 1999) assumption (CIA) 
is satisfied and the impact of Annex I membership can be identified.  
Let Yij
0
 denote the percentage of statements supporting country j, made by any given country i 
if it were not in Annex I, and let Yij
1
 denote the percentage of supportive statements if the 
same country i were in Annex I. The difference Yij
1
- Yij
0
 in these potential outcomes represents 
the impact of Annex I membership. Let X denote all the confounding variables which 
simultaneously influence these potential outcomes and the probability that country i is 
member of Annex I, including income, emissions and all other relevant characteristics 
mentioned above. As our data set is very rich and includes all variables we could think of as 
potentially important for either selection into Annex I or the share of joint statements, we are 
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confident that the CIA is satisfied. By conditioning on X, the potential outcomes are then 
identified as:  
 
E[Yj
1 
|X] = E(Yj |D=1, X)   and   E[Yj
0 
|X] = E(Yj |D=0, X), 
 
where D denotes the observed status of Annex I membership of country i (D=1 for Annex I 
countries, D=0 for non-Annex I countries). With this relationship and by averaging with 
respect to the population distribution of X, the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is 
identified as: 
 
ATT =    1|1|
01 )],0|(),1|([)]|()|([ DXjjDXjj dFXDYEXDYEdFXYEXYE . (2) 
 
This effect can be distinguished from the treatment effect on the untreated (ATU), i.e. the 
effect of Annex I membership on countries that are not members so far: 
 
ATU =    0|0|
01 )],0|(),1|([)]|()|([ DXjjDXjj dFXDYEXDYEdFXYEXYE .(3) 
 
Since Annex I and non-Annex I countries differ in a number of characteristics, the effect of 
having been selected as an Annex I country (ATT) and the effect of being selected among 
current non-Annex I countries may be different so that it may be interesting to look at both. 
As demonstrated by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), the estimation of the treatment effect can 
be facilitated if the information incorporated in the relevant control variables is first projected 
into a single variable, the propensity score p(x)=P(D=1|X=x). They showed that if matching 
on X is consistent, matching with respect to the propensity score p(x) is consistent as well. 
The multidimensional problem of matching on X is thereby reduced to the one-dimensional 
problem of matching on p(X). The propensity score is usually estimated by a probit 
regression, i.e., in our case by a probit regression of the binary treatment variable ―Annex I 
membership‖ on X.  
The control variables X are selected on the basis of the common relevance for selection into 
Annex I and for supportive statements. The discussion of the tobit model already gave us 
some initial idea about variables relevant in the latter context. But to satisfy the CIA, we also 
need to look at the correlates of Annex I membership. Just as in the case of our tobit 
regressions, we do so by first identifying a large number of theoretically plausible variables 
which we then reduce to a smaller number running a mechanical statistical selection 
procedure. To be sure not to omit any relevant variable, we set the cut-off at a p-value of 30%, 
and carry out both, forward and backward selection eventually using all variables that have 
been included in either of the two. In addition, we include variables that appear particularly 
pertinent from the joint statements regression and GNI per capita, which is usually 
insignificant after controlling for the other variables in our regressions, but yet an important 
theoretical determinant of Annex I membership. Results of the final probit estimation are 
presented in Appendix B, Table B4.  
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For the estimation of the conditional expectation function we use nearest neighbor matching 
with the five nearest neighbors, i.e., we compare each observation for an Annex I country, 
with the five non-Annex I observations that have the most similar propensity score, and vice 
versa. We opt for nearest neighbor matching rather than kernel matching or radius matching 
simply because this option generated the most convincing matches whereby treated and 
untreated countries no longer significantly differ in any of the relevant characteristics. Table 4 
presents the comparison of means among Annex I and non-Annex I members as in Table 2 
and compares them to the means after the matching procedure
10
.  
 
Table 4: Comparison of means before and after matching 
Variable 
 
Sample 
 
Mean 
Treated  Control 
%bias 
 
% reduct 
|bias| 
t-test 
t        p>|t| 
GNI per capita Unmatched 26.91 7.54 159.00  8.70 0.00 
 Matched 19.50 22.02 -20.70 87.00 -0.69 0.50 
Education Unmatched 87.70 57.46 176.70  7.42 0.00 
 Matched 85.51 87.78 -13.20 92.50 -0.69 0.50 
Vulnerability Unmatched 3.71 3.29 62.10  2.97 0.00 
 Matched 3.61 3.86 -36.60 41.00 -1.16 0.25 
CO2 emissions Unmatched 8.71 3.87 73.20  3.23 0.00 
per capita Matched 8.05 7.45 9.10 87.60 0.41 0.68 
Renewables Unmatched 0.78 0.03 67.70  5.76 0.00 
 Matched 0.15 0.21 -4.80 93.00 -0.45 0.65 
Left government Unmatched 0.28 0.28 -0.40  -0.02 0.98 
 Matched 0.28 0.34 -12.50 -2767.30 -0.37 0.71 
Right government Unmatched 0.32 0.12 49.10  2.89 0.00 
 Matched 0.29 0.31 -4.70 90.50 -0.12 0.90 
Freedom House Unmatched 1.52 3.87 -152.30  -7.18 0.00 
Index Matched 1.88 2.24 -23.50 84.60 -0.73 0.47 
UNGA voting Unmatched 0.30 0.11 242.00  11.32 0.00 
 Matched 0.29 0.25 52.90 78.10 0.89 0.38 
Intl. agreements Unmatched 79.19 58.03 124.00  6.61 0.00 
 Matched 66.69 62.98 21.80 82.50 0.91 0.37 
English language Unmatched 0.15 0.38 -53.00  -2.53 0.01 
 Matched 0.21 0.29 -19.60 63.00 -0.58 0.56 
For variable descriptions, see Appendix A, Table A2. 
 
This highly convincing matching result does, however, come at a cost. In fact, to compare 
only those countries that are comparable at all, we impose common support, i.e., we delete all 
observations from the dataset that are outside the range of characteristics for the comparison 
group. Table 5 shows that the actual number of countries that are eventually used in our 
analysis, thereby shrinks considerably to about 60. Moreover, we had to exclude the variable 
reflecting the total number of interventions. As soon as this variable is included in the 
analysis, the matching procedure is unable to find convincing matches. This may be 
problematic as the number of interventions is clearly important as a determinant of supportive 
                                                 
10
 Values between Table 2 and Table 4 may differ due to missing values in some of the variables used in the 
matching procedure. 
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statements. At the same time, it was generally not significant in the probit regressions we 
estimated to find the most appropriate equation for the propensity score, at soon as the other 
variables were controlled for. We therefore believe that the CIA is satisfied even without 
inclusion of the number of interventions as a control. 
The results of our nonparametric matching estimator, for both ATT and ATU are also 
presented in Table 5. The matching analysis was carried out using the corresponding Stata 
module prepared by Leuven and Sianesi (2003).  
 
Table 5: Estimation results of propensity score matching 
% of supportive ATT  ATU  off support on support 
votes for:   untreated treated untreated treated 
EU 0.86  0.09  103 14 42 19 
USA 0.78  0.26  103 15 42 19 
Russia 1.73 * 2.52 * 107 16 38 17 
AOSIS -0.13  -0.24  102 15 42 19 
African Group -0.15  -0.38  102 15 42 19 
Tuvalu -0.28  -0.48  102 15 42 19 
China -0.54  -1.20 ** 101 15 43 19 
India -0.80  -1.09 *** 102 15 42 19 
Saudi Arabia -0.38  -0.69 * 103 15 41 19 
Notes: Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
Constant not reported. For variable descriptions, see Appendix A, Table A2. 
 
Our results show that, at least for statements in support of some countries (Russia, China, 
India and Saudi Arabia) either ATT or ATU are significant. In several other cases, the 
estimates are very close to significant at the 10% level (e.g., ATU for Africa, with a t-value of 
1.61, and for Tuvalu, with a t-value of 1.56). Even for a considerably restricted set of 
comparable countries, and when comparing each country only to those countries that are the 
most similar in all relevant country characteristics, it appears that the effect of Annex I 
membership cannot be neglected. All significant treatment effects are sizeable and show the 
expected sign. With 1.7 percentage points, ATT corresponds to about 0.9 standard deviations 
of the support for Russia, with 2.5, ATU corresponds to 1.4 standard deviations of support for 
Russia. In the cases of China, India and Saudi Arabia, the significant ATU correspond to 0.5, 
0.6 and 0.4 the standard deviation, respectively. Thus, while the matching exercise – notably 
through the reduction in the number of observations – led to lower levels of significance, the 
estimated impacts are even higher than in the tobit regressions presented above. Even if, in 
our matching analysis, the impact is not discernible for joint statements with all nine different 
countries considered here, it is well discernible for some.  
This implies that the split between Annex I and non-Annex I membership has indeed been 
responsible for some of the negotiation dynamics observed during the UNFCCC negotiations. 
For given country characteristics, Annex I membership played a role for positions supported 
in the negotiation process. Since, at given country characteristics, Annex I countries tend to 
support other Annex I countries, while non-Annex I countries tend to support them less, the 
mere existence of the split between Annex I and non-Annex I seems to have amplified the 
existing divide between developing and industrialized countries. 
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More generally, this implies that the creation of new country groups within an international 
negotiation process has institutional consequences that require some in-depth reflection. 
Short-term agreements found via differential treatment of specific country groups may come 
at a cost during later negotiation rounds. While our evidence for the UNFCCC does not 
suggest that the consequences of the Annex I / non-Annex I divide have been disastrous for 
the negotiation outcomes, it still suggests that they exist.  
Three theoretical arguments have been advanced in Section 3 to support our constructed peer-
group hypothesis that describes this phenomenon: group psychology (closer relationships 
through exchange within groups), negotiation structure (initial group discussions leading to 
more distanced positions debated at the global level), and new incentives (fighting for the 
preservation of new group-related privileges). In this paper, we cannot distinguish between 
these three effects.  
However, the distinction appears to be relevant for appropriate policy recommendations. If 
the new incentives argument is relevant, negotiators may be able to mitigate or even avoid the 
negotiation dynamics described above, by agreeing on automatic ‗graduation rules‘ from one 
group to the other, or, in any case, on fixed membership criteria rather than fixed country lists. 
As Rajamani (2006) discusses, differential treatment needs to work within a controlled 
framework, in which it does not obstruct the general purpose of the treaty, it responds to real 
differences across pre-determined country categories, and it ceases to exist when these 
differences cease to exist. If the group psychology or the negotiation structure arguments are 
more relevant, it may be more promising to channel the formal and informal debates in an 
open, transparent and inclusive way, and to build bridges through cross-cutting working 
groups like the Environmental Integrity Group. It may be worthwhile to follow these 
questions in further research. To reach more general conclusions, such research could also 
compare the case of the UNFCCC elaborated here, to more detailed case studies of other 
international organizations such as the WTO. 
 
6. Conclusions 
International organizations sometimes institutionalize country groupings by specifying 
differentiated rules and commitments that may, in turn, generate new negotiation dynamics. 
We propose a theoretical explanation for such dynamics through our ―constructed peer-group‖ 
hypothesis and advance three theoretical arguments in its support. These are: (i) group 
psychology, (ii) changes in the structure of the negotiation process, and (iii) new incentives. 
The constructed peer-group hypothesis is analyzed at the example of the UNFCCC‘s split 
between Annex I and non-Annex I countries.  
Using a self-coded dataset of country statements during the climate change negotiation rounds 
between December 2007 and December 2009 we assess whether Annex I membership 
influences a country‘s stance towards other countries‘ arguments. The challenge of the 
econometric estimation is to disentangle the effect of group construction from the effect of 
various background characteristics that may drive countries‘ preferences and, simultaneously, 
the affiliation to Annex I. As a response, we do not only carry out multivariate tobit 
regression analysis, but also apply propensity score matching, i.e., a quasi-experimental 
method allowing us to avoid functional form assumptions and to restrict the sample to 
effectively comparable observations.  
We find that, over and above the ex ante differences in country characteristics and 
preferences, the split between Annex I and non-Annex I countries has indeed influenced 
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negotiation behavior and thereby amplified the existing divide between developing and 
industrialized countries. This supports our constructed peer-group hypothesis, and thereby the 
idea of path dependence for negotiation structures and dynamics. If new incentives due to the 
privileges for non-Annex I countries are the driving force of this result, it may be important to 
attach privileges to the relevant country characteristics, rather than to a list of country names 
in the future. If group psychology and / or negotiation structure are more relevant, appropriate 
chairing of the negotiation rounds with transparent and inclusive channels for formal and 
informal debates and ample opportunities for deliberations in settings including both Annex I 
and non-Annex I members (e.g., through cross-cutting working groups) could mitigate the 
divide between these groups. Whatever is more important here is a question we have to leave 
for future research. 
 
 
List of abbreviations 
ALBA   Bolivarian Alliance of Latin American Countries 
AOSIS  Alliance of Small Island States 
ATT   Average treatment effect on the treated 
ATU   Average treatment effect on the untreated 
BASIC  Group of Brazil, China, India and South Africa 
CACAM  Central Asia and the Caucasus, Albania and Moldova 
CDM   Clean Development Mechanism 
CIA   Conditional independence assumption 
COP   Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC 
EIG   Environmental Integrity Group 
ENB   Earth Negotiations Bulletin 
EU   European Union 
EVI   Environmental Vulnerability Index 
GHGs   Greenhouse gases 
IISD   International Institute for Sustainable Development 
LDCs   Least Developed Countries 
OECD   Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OPEC   Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
SICA   Central American Integration System 
SIDSs   Small Island Developing States 
SOPAC  South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission 
UNFCCC  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
UNGA  United Nations General Assembly 
US   United States 
WTO   World Trade Organization 
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Appendix A: Variables and Sources 
Table A1: Countries most active in the negotiations 
Country Number of 
interventions 
Group 
European Union 540 Annex I 
G-77 382 Non-Annex I 
Japan 320 Annex I 
Australia 285 Annex I 
China 266 Non-Annex I 
United States of America 238 Annex I 
AOSIS 231 Non-Annex I 
Saudi Arabia 227 Non-Annex I 
Brazil 225 Non-Annex I 
Canada 216 Annex I 
India 205 Non-Annex I 
New Zealand 198 Annex I 
Norway 160 Annex I 
African Group 132 Non-Annex I 
South Africa 130 Non-Annex I 
Tuvalu 126 Non-Annex I 
Switzerland 109 Annex I 
LDCs 109 Non-Annex I 
Colombia 89 Non-Annex I 
Bolivia 79 Non-Annex I 
Argentina 78 Non-Annex I 
Bangladesh 72 Non-Annex I 
Mexico 72 Non-Annex I 
Russian Federation 70 Annex I 
Venezuela 62 Non-Annex I 
Note: Countries in bold letters are those that have been chosen for the empirical estimation as dependent variables. 
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Table A2: Variable descriptions 
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Sources (year of data, if 
different from 2007) 
Support EU Statements supporting EU in % of all EU statements 200 0.39 1.26 0.00 8.89 IISD 2007-2009 (2007-2009) 
Support USA Statements supporting US in % of all US statements 200 0.36 1.49 0.00 10.50 IISD 2007-2009 (2007-2009) 
Support Russia Statements supporting Russia in % of all Russian statements 200 0.48 1.82 0.00 12.86 IISD 2007-2009 (2007-2009) 
Support AOSIS Statements supporting AOSIS in % of all AOSIS statements 200 0.46 1.35 0.00 10.39 IISD 2007-2009 (2007-2009) 
Support Africa Statements supporting African Group in % of all African 
Group statements 
200 0.52 1.66 0.00 12.12 IISD 2007-2009 (2007-2009) 
Support Tuvalu Statements supporting Tuvalu in % of all Tuvalu statements 200 0.38 1.03 0.00 7.14 IISD 2007-2009 (2007-2009) 
Support China Statements supporting China in % of all Chinese statements 200 0.82 2.46 0.00 20.68 IISD 2007-2009 (2007-2009) 
Support India Statements supporting India in % of all Indian statements 200 0.60 1.92 0.00 20.00 IISD 2007-2009 (2007-2009) 
Support Saudi 
Arabia 
Statements supporting Saudi Arabia in % of all Saudi 
statements 
200 0.54 1.60 0.00 15.42 IISD 2007-2009 (2007-2009) 
Annex I Annex I membership  200 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 UNFCCC 2010a (2010) 
Population Population (in million) 201 79.72 399.66 0.00 5100.00 World Bank 2009 
GDP GDP [current US$ trillion] 199 0.56 2.37 0.00 22.00 World Bank 2009 
GNI per capita 
 
GNI per capita, PPP [in thousands of international $]  
(imputed using GDP and population) 
198 12.77 15.77 0.28 107.39 World Bank 2009 
English language English is national or official language 201 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 Lewis 2009 (2009) 
French language French is national or official language 201 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 Lewis 2009 (2009) 
Education 
 
Net secondary enrolment rates, in % (imputed using GDP and 
gross secondary enrolment) 
199 64.66 24.13 2.60 104.79 World Bank 2009 
Agriculture Value added from agri-culture/GDP 200 14.23 14.37 0.00 76.90 World Bank 2009  
Vulnerability Climate change vulnerability, EVI index 198 3.44 0.76 1.67 5.50 SOPAC 2010 
Vulnerability per 
GDP 
[Climate change vulnerability(EVI index)/GDP per capita] 
*10³ 
195 1.29 2.62 0.04 29.72 SOPAC 2010, World Bank 
2009 
CO2 emissions CO2 emissions, in giga tons 195 0.32 1.48 0.00 13.00 UNSTATS 2010, UNFCCC 
2010b 
CO2 emissions per 
capita 
CO2 emissions [t/capita] 195 2016.50 28088.65 0.02 392241.70 UNSTATS 2010, UNFCCC 
2010b, World Bank 2009 
Renewables 
 
Energy production from solar, tide, wave and wind in % of 
energy consumption 
200 0.18 0.73 0.00 7.70 US Energy Information 
Administration 2010 
Colony Former European colony 201 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 Michaelowa et al. 2009 
Fossil exports Value of coal and oil exports / GDP 199 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.66 UN Comtrade 2010 
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Table A2: Variable descriptions (cont.) 
 
 
 
Variable Description N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Sources (year of data, if 
different from 2007) 
Trade with China Value of exports to and imports from China / GDP 199 0.30 3.25 0.00 45.85 CoW Trade 2007, World Bank 
2009 
Trade with Saudi 
Arabia 
Value of exports to and imports from Saudi Arabia / GDP 186 1.37 18.48 0.00 252.03 CoW Trade 2007, World Bank 
2009 
Trade with Tuvalu Value of exports to and imports from Tuvalu / GDP 201 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 CoW Trade 2007, World Bank 
2009 
Trade with USA Value of exports to and imports from the US / GDP 188 0.09 0.11 0.00 0.66 CoW Trade 2007, World Bank 
2009 
Aid from EU 
 
Net bilateral aid flows from EU countries and EU 
council/GDP 
201 0.03 0.07 -0.01 0.49 DAC 2007, World Bank 2009 
Aid from USA Net bilateral aid flows from US/GDP 201 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.39 DAC 2007, World Bank 2009 
Freedom House Freedom House index, 1=free,...,7=unfree 199 3.24 1.93 1.00 7.00 Freedom House 2008 
Right government Right-wing government 201 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 DPI 2010 (2009) 
Left government Left-wing government 201 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 DPI 2010 (2009) 
UNGA voting Vote share with the US in UN general assembly, 2005-2008 187 0.15 0.12 0.00 0.69 Dreher 2008 (average 2005-
2008) 
Intl. agreements Participation in international agreements (no of memberships) 197 61.88 20.42 16.00 125.00 CoW IGO 2005 (2005) 
Flexible mechanisms 
 
Use of flexible mechanisms=[No of CDM+JI projects with 
national entities as buyers or sellers/GDP (in cur. US$)]*10
9
 
201 0.06 0.40 0.00 4.04 UNEP Risoe 2010 (2010) 
Forests Proportion of land area covered by forests 199 0.30 0.23 0.00 0.95 FAO 2005 (2005) 
No of interventions No of interventions in UNFCCC, Dec. 2009-Dec. 2010 201 30.62 73.11 0.00 540.00 IISD 2007-2009 (2007-2009) 
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Table A3: Correlation matrix 
 
Annex I Population GDP GNI per 
capita 
English 
language 
French 
language 
Education Agriculture Vulnerability Vulnerability 
per GDP 
Annex I 1.00          
Population -0.04 1.00         
GDP 0.29 0.19 1.00        
GNI per capita 0.55 -0.05 0.24 1.00       
English language -0.16 0.17 -0.06 -0.12 1.00      
French language -0.12 0.18 -0.13 -0.12 0.06 1.00     
Education 0.50 -0.05 0.23 0.63 -0.18 -0.35 1.00    
Agriculture -0.38 0.02 -0.23 -0.57 0.16 0.22 -0.64 1.00   
Vulnerability 0.28 0.00 0.12 0.31 0.02 -0.14 0.42 -0.31 1.00  
Vulnerability/GDP -0.22 -0.04 -0.14 -0.32 0.06 0.08 -0.31 0.38 -0.13 1.00 
CO2 emissions 0.05 0.21 0.82 0.02 -0.05 -0.10 0.07 -0.09 0.07 -0.06 
CO2 emissions/cap 0.23 -0.03 0.14 0.79 -0.12 -0.15 0.47 -0.44 0.22 -0.22 
Renewables 0.40 -0.01 0.19 0.31 -0.06 -0.09 0.23 -0.19 0.20 -0.10 
Colony -0.55 -0.13 -0.24 -0.47 0.18 0.17 -0.47 0.22 -0.27 0.18 
Fossil exports -0.13 -0.01 0.01 0.19 -0.14 -0.10 0.01 -0.14 0.02 -0.09 
Trade with China -0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 0.05 0.10 0.08 
Trade w Saudi Arabia -0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 0.04 0.11 0.07 
Trade with Tuvalu -0.05 0.05 -0.04 -0.05 0.15 0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 
Trade with USA -0.22 0.01 -0.03 -0.06 0.10 0.00 -0.01 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 
Aid from EU -0.25 0.00 -0.18 -0.34 0.16 0.19 -0.53 0.51 -0.26 0.47 
Aid from USA -0.15 0.02 -0.11 -0.21 0.15 0.01 -0.28 0.31 -0.17 0.36 
Freedom House -0.52 0.03 -0.12 -0.36 -0.08 0.13 -0.41 0.36 -0.21 0.32 
Right government 0.22 -0.02 0.10 0.20 0.08 -0.16 0.24 -0.23 0.20 -0.15 
Left government -0.02 0.04 0.13 -0.11 -0.08 -0.11 0.02 -0.02 -0.07 0.07 
UNGA voting 0.82 -0.05 0.24 0.51 -0.19 -0.20 0.54 -0.40 0.32 -0.26 
Intl. agreements 0.45 0.03 0.42 0.33 -0.24 0.05 0.20 -0.28 -0.02 -0.15 
Flexible mechanisms 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.24 0.11 -0.04 0.17 -0.10 0.16 -0.06 
Forests 0.08 0.00 0.02 -0.04 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.01 -0.30 -0.03 
No of interventions 0.11 0.51 0.42 0.12 0.20 0.12 0.11 -0.12 -0.01 -0.11 
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Table A3: Correlation matrix (cont.) 
 
CO2 
emissions 
CO2 
emissions/cap 
Renewables Colony Fossil 
exports 
Trade with 
China 
Trade with 
Saudi Arabia 
Trade with 
Tuvalu 
Trade with 
USA 
Aid from EU 
CO2 emissions 1.00          
CO2 emissions/cap 0.06 1.00         
Renewables 0.02 0.09 1.00        
Colony -0.14 -0.35 -0.22 1.00       
Fossil exports 0.02 0.38 -0.06 -0.10 1.00      
Trade with China -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.09 -0.02 1.00     
Trade w Saudi Arabia -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.09 -0.02 1.00 1.00    
Trade with Tuvalu -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 1.00   
Trade with USA 0.00 -0.02 -0.07 0.27 0.09 -0.05 -0.06 0.00 1.00  
Aid from EU -0.10 -0.26 -0.11 0.17 -0.08 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.02 1.00 
Aid from USA -0.06 -0.15 -0.07 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.17 0.68 
Freedom House 0.10 -0.05 -0.28 0.18 0.25 0.15 0.14 0.05 -0.03 0.19 
Right government -0.02 0.07 0.17 -0.05 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.22 -0.17 
Left government 0.13 -0.14 0.06 0.08 -0.10 0.12 0.12 -0.05 0.00 -0.03 
UNGA voting 0.00 0.20 0.37 -0.57 -0.15 -0.07 -0.06 -0.02 -0.17 -0.26 
Intl. agreements 0.17 0.06 0.40 0.00 -0.04 -0.16 -0.15 -0.09 0.06 -0.21 
Flexible mechanisms 0.01 0.08 0.01 -0.12 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.18 -0.06 
Forests -0.03 -0.14 -0.02 0.10 -0.28 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.18 0.02 
No of interventions 0.36 0.07 0.03 -0.17 0.06 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.11 
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Table A3: Correlation matrix (cont.) 
 
Aid from 
USA 
Freedom 
House 
Right 
government 
Left 
government 
UNGA 
voting 
Intl. 
agreements 
Flexible 
mechanisms 
Forests No of 
interventions 
Aid from USA 1.00         
Freedom House 0.19 1.00        
Right government -0.10 -0.36 1.00       
Left government -0.10 -0.03 -0.28 1.00      
UNGA voting -0.15 -0.67 0.28 0.00 1.00     
Intl. agreements -0.18 -0.42 0.20 0.10 0.40 1.00    
Flexible mechanisms -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.03 1.00   
Forests -0.04 -0.18 0.01 0.14 0.08 0.06 -0.08 1.00  
No of interventions -0.05 -0.11 0.00 0.12 0.12 0.22 0.02 0.00 1.00 
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Appendix B: Additional statistical results 
Table B1: Determinants of supportive statements (in %), additional tobit regressions 
 
 Support for: 
 
EU 
 
USA 
 
Russia 
 
AOSIS 
 
African 
Group 
Tuvalu 
 
China 
  
India 
 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Annex I 0.206   0.074   0.259   -0.229 *** -0.257 ** -0.183 *** -0.267 ** -0.363 *** -0.075   
No of interventions 0.005 *** 0.000  0.000  0.005 *** 0.004 *** 0.003 *** 0.006 *** 0.005 *** 0.004 *** 
Population 0.000 *** 0.000  0.000  0.000 ** 0.000  0.000 ** 0.000 ** 0.000 * 0.000  
GNI per capita 0.004  0.000  0.000  0.003  -0.003  -0.004  0.001  -0.004  0.007 ** 
Education 0.003 * 0.000  0.000  -0.005 ** -0.003  0.000  0.002  0.003  0.000  
English language 0.158 ** 0.018  0.008  0.016  0.178  0.012  0.094  0.075  -0.007  
French language -0.028  -0.004  0.002  -0.100  -0.150 * 0.011  -0.113 ** -0.196 *** -0.149 *** 
Intl. agreements 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.005 ** 0.008 ** 0.000  0.006 ** 0.009 *** 0.004  
CO2 emissions -0.008  -0.002  -0.001  0.127 ** 0.142 * 0.037  0.471 *** 0.391 *** 0.208 ** 
Freedom House -0.012  -0.002  0.001  -0.041 * -0.024  -0.046 ** -0.017  -0.027  -0.003  
Right government 0.009  0.003  0.005  0.040  -0.103  0.043  -0.028  -0.060  -0.033  
Left government 0.023  0.005  0.002  0.067  0.096  0.059  0.078  0.084  0.129 * 
Agriculture 0.005 * 0.001  0.000  0.001  -0.001  -0.002  0.000  -0.001  0.002  
Vulnerability -0.119 *** -0.010  -0.005  0.012  0.056  0.025  -0.031  -0.006  -0.012  
UNGA voting 0.350  -0.005  0.005  -0.114  -0.425  0.088  -1.129 * -0.736  -1.683 ** 
Colony 0.079  -0.003  -0.016  -0.119  -0.268  0.002  -0.014  -0.114  0.006  
Fossil exports -0.162  -0.041  -0.024  -0.795  0.229  -0.376  0.427  0.796 * 0.396  
Forests -0.126  -0.026  -0.026  0.078  0.308  0.171  -0.088  0.197  -0.245  
Renewables -0.096  -0.026  -0.023  -0.194  -0.316  -0.089  -0.612 *** -0.399 ** -0.504 *** 
Flexible mechanisms 0.013  0.002  -0.014  0.072  -0.122  0.097  0.076  0.159  0.096  
Trade with China             -0.006      
Trade with Tuvalu           -27.685        
Trade with USA   0.042                
Aid from USA   -1.624                
Aid from EU -0.691                  
Trade Saudi Arabia                 -0.874   
Observations 178  177  178  178  178  178  178  178  168  
Left censored 125  145  158  130  136  138  119  124  116  
Log likelihood -103  -60  -63  -13  -131  -102  -140  -142  -119  
Pseudo R² 0.42  0.56  0.42  0.39  0.27  0.35  0.42  0.34  0.40  
                   
Notes: Tobit regressions, values are for marginal effects, with yij=0 if xi‘b + ui ≤ 0, and yij =xi‘b+ui otherwise. 
Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. Constant not reported. For 
variable descriptions, see Appendix A, Table A2. 
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Table B2: Determinants of supportive statements (in %), additional tobit regressions 
 
Support for: EU USA Russia AOSIS African 
Group 
Tuvalu China India Saudi 
Arabia 
Annex I 0.142   0.311 ** 1.130 *** -0.296 *** -0.457 *** -0.432 *** -0.535 *** -0.663 *** -0.110   
No of interventions 0.005 *** 0.003 *** 0.004 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.008 *** 0.006 *** 0.005 *** 
Population 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ** 0.000 *** 0.000 * 0.000 ** 0.000 *** 0.000 ** 0.000  
GNI per capita     -0.012 **       0.006 **   0.009 *** 
Education 0.003 **   0.005 * -0.004 **           
English language 0.193 *** 0.082 **         0.112      
French language             -0.202 ** -0.315 *** -0.205 *** 
Intl. agreements       0.004 *     0.008 *** 0.010 *** 0.005 ** 
CO2 emissions       0.166 *** 0.254 *** 0.063  0.625 *** 0.440 *** 0.233 *** 
Freedom House   -0.032 ***   -0.047 **   -0.075 ***       
Right government                   
Left government   0.046          0.104    0.156 ** 
Agriculture   0.005 ***               
Vulnerability -0.119 *** -0.089 *** -0.190 **             
UNGA voting 0.392            -1.326 *   -2.205 *** 
Colony   0.009  -0.173              
Fossil exports       -0.607    -0.739        
Forests   -0.181 ** -1.095 ***   0.320        -0.325 ** 
Renewables   -0.163 * -0.726 **       -0.857 *** -0.472 * -0.624 *** 
Flexible mechanisms   0.057 *   0.105        0.175 *   
Trade with USA   0.344 **               
Aid from USA   -12.660 ***               
Trade Saudi Arabia                                 -1.054 * 
Observations 178  177  178  178  178  178  178  178  168  
Left censored 125  145  158  130  136  138  119  124  116  
Log likelihood -108  -62  -67  -116  -138  -105  -142  -146  -121  
Pseudo R2 0.39  0.54  0.38  0.38  0.23  0.33  0.41  0.32  0.39  
Notes: Tobit regressions, values are for marginal effects, with yij>0. Results after stepwise selection of the 
explanatory variables. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
Constant not reported. For variable descriptions, see Appendix A, Table A2. 
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Table B3: Determinants of supportive statements (in %), additional tobit regressions 
 
Support for EU 
 
USA 
 
Russia 
 
AOSIS 
 
African 
Group 
Tuvalu China India Saudi 
Arabia 
Annex I 0.182   0.189   0.745 ** -0.304 *** -0.399 ** -0.339 *** -0.508 *** -0.589 *** -0.096   
No of interventions 0.005 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.004 *** 0.007 *** 0.006 *** 0.005 *** 
Population 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ** 0.000  0.000 ** 0.000 *** 0.000 ** 0.000  
GNI per capita 0.004  0.002  -0.010 * 0.003  -0.004  -0.005  0.001  -0.004  0.008 ** 
Education 0.003 * 0.001  0.006 * -0.005 ** -0.004  0.000  0.002  0.003  0.000  
English language 0.151 ** 0.090 ** 0.168  0.016  0.202  0.016  0.114  0.082  -0.008  
French language -0.031  -0.034  0.044  -0.110  -0.205  0.015  -0.170 * -0.264 ** -0.210 *** 
Intl. agreements 0.000  0.001  0.005  0.005 ** 0.010 ** 0.001  0.008 ** 0.011 *** 0.005 * 
CO2 emissions -0.008  -0.013  -0.050  0.128 ** 0.172 * 0.048  0.608 *** 0.441 *** 0.244 *** 
Freedom House -0.013  -0.017  0.051  -0.042 * -0.029  -0.060 ** -0.022  -0.030  -0.004  
Right government 0.010  0.026  0.172  0.041  -0.124  0.056  -0.035  -0.067  -0.039  
Left government 0.024  0.042  0.073  0.068  0.116  0.076  0.100  0.094  0.151 * 
Agriculture 0.005 * 0.006 *** -0.001  0.001  -0.001  -0.003  0.000  -0.001  0.002  
Vulnerability -0.123 *** -0.078 *** -0.165 ** 0.012  0.068  0.033  -0.041  -0.007  -0.014  
UNGA voting 0.365  -0.042  0.173  -0.115  -0.513  0.114  -1.454 * -0.829  -1.967 ** 
Colony 0.084  -0.021  -0.273 * -0.117  -0.306  0.003  -0.019  -0.125  0.008  
Fossil exports -0.169  -0.316  -0.830  -0.803  0.276  -0.488  0.550  0.896 * 0.463  
Forests -0.132  -0.197 ** -0.899 *** 0.078  0.372  0.222  -0.114  0.222  -0.286  
Renewables -0.100  -0.199 ** -0.812 *** -0.196  -0.382  -0.116  -0.788 *** -0.450 * -0.589 ** 
Flexible mechanisms 0.013  0.016  -0.480  0.072  -0.147  0.126  0.098  0.178  0.112  
Trade with China -0.719                  
Trade with Tuvalu   0.320 *               
Trade with USA   -12.464 ***               
Aid from USA           -35.919        
Aid from EU                         -0.008         
Trade Saudi Arabia                 -1.021 * 
Observations 178  177  178  178  178  178  178  178  168  
Left censored 125  145  158  130  136  138  119  124  116  
Log likelihood -103  -60  -63  -13  -131  -102  -140  -142  -119  
Pseudo R2 0.42  0.56  0.42  0.39  0.27  0.35  0.42  0.34  0.40  
Notes: Tobit regressions, values are for marginal effects, with yij>0. Results including all explanatory variables 
in the regressions. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. Constant 
not reported. For variable descriptions, see Appendix A, Table A2. 
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Table B4: Estimating the propensity score: probit regression for Annex I membership 
 
Coefficient Marginal 
effect 
P-value 
GNI per capita 0.032 0.001 0.368 
Education 0.071 0.001 0.017 
Vulnerability -0.096 -0.002 0.792 
CO2 emissions per capita -0.048 -0.001 0.323 
Renewables 1.157 0.020 0.205 
Left government -0.665 -0.012 0.215 
Right government -0.876 -0.015 0.170 
Freedom House 0.072 0.001 0.684 
UNGA voting 6.845 0.120 0.003 
Intl. agreements 0.038 0.001 0.039 
English language -1.076 -0.016 0.118 
Constant -9.870  0.005 
Observations 179   
Log likelihood -25.35   
Pseudo R² 0.71   
Note: For variable descriptions, see Appendix A, Table A2. 
